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6.1  Introduction 
The European Monetary System (EMS), greeted with considerable skepti- 
cism in 1978, is now enjoying remarkable popularity. The causes of this shift 
in public opinion are plausibly to be found in the history of the international 
monetary system during two periods: from 1971 to 1978, and from 1979 to the 
present. In Europe, the period following  the collapse of the Bretton Woods 
system was characterized  by several attempts to limit exchange rate fluctua- 
tions,  represented  by  experiments  with  the  “snake.”  These  experiments 
proved to be a failure for the large  “romance”  countries:  France and Italy. 
France made two attempts and ltaly one attempt to join the snake, which were 
definitely abandoned in, respectively,  1976 and 1973. The Belgian franc, the 
Dutch guilder, and the Deutsche mark, by contrast, entered the snake in 1972 
and never left it until the start of  the EMS. 
The failed  attempts of  France and  Italy,  and  the suspicion  that  the new 
technical features that characterized the EMS were more like gimmickry than 
substantial reforms, justified the skepticism of observers in 1978. On the other 
hand, during the most recent decade, events in the world financial markets have 
renewed  dissatisfaction  with  flexible  exchange  rates.  The  unprecedented 
swings of the nominal and real dollar exchange rate, associated with a dramatic 
worsening of  the U.S. current account balance, and the new position of the 
United  States  as  the  largest  debtor in  the  world  economy, have  led  many 
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observers to believe that there is something inherently unstable about flexible 
exchange rates,  and  that  it  would  be  desirable to reform  the international 
monetary  system.  All  the  leading  proposals  for  world  monetary  reform 
advocate, in one form or another, the limitation of exchange rate flexibility. 
In stark contrast with the gyrations of the dollar, European currencies and 
intra-European  competitiveness  indices  have  kept relatively  stable over the 
past ten years’; at the same time, inflation rates and inflation rate differentials 
across  Europe have  been  dramatically  reduced.  Hence the  shift  in  public 
opinion and the renewed interest in the EMS. In this paper we discuss some 
aspects of the EMS experience in an attempt to answer the question of whether 
the EMS can be copied outside Europe. 
This paper is organized around two main questions. The first is: why is the 
aversion  to exchange rate  fluctuations  stronger  in Europe than  elsewhere? 
European countries are  highly  integrated  and  have  built  institutions-the 
Common Market for agricultural products  in particular-that  are dependent 
upon exchange rate stability. European exchange rate stability is justified by 
a much broader and more important trend toward economic unification, which 
in part transcends purely economic motivations. In section 6.2 we discuss the 
economic and historical justifications for limiting exchange rate flexibility in 
Europe, and in section 6.3 we review the workings of the EMS exchange rate 
arrangements. 
The second  question  is: how  does the EMS hold together?  What are the 
macroeconomic  benefits  from belonging to the system?2 It is often said that 
joining the EMS has helped high-inflation countries  like France and Italy to 
disinflate. Theoretical models suggest that such an arrangement is desirable for 
the inflation-prone countries when the nominal exchange rate target is more 
credible than money stock targets or interest rate targets. However, there is no 
accepted explanation of why nominal exchange rate targets are more credible. 
The explanation we propose is based on the claim that the EMS exchange rate 
targets are a part of a broader agreement that includes the Common Market and 
the other community institutions. Abandoning  the EMS targets is equivalent 
to abandoning this larger system. An additional complication  is that, in the 
EMS, the country exporting its reputation  as an “inflation  fighter”  tends to 
suffer higher inflation than it would otherwise. The disinflation which occurred 
after the  start of  the EMS and the stabilization  of  the Federal  Republic  of 
Germany’s real effective exchange rate are discussed in sections 6.4 and 6.5. 
The achievement of monetary convergence, which can be credited in part 
to the EMS, has been reached at the expense of divergent fiscal performances. 
In section 6.6 we discuss the effects of the EMS on the fiscal performances of 
the countries that joined it. In section 6.7 we offer a few concluding remarks. 
6.2  Why Did Europeans Set Up the EMS? 
The coordination of  macroeconomic policies has a long tradition in Europe: 
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Treaty of Rome. The immediate effect of the treaty was the establishment of 
a customs union and of a common market for cereals-later  extended to all 
agricultural products. But its intentions were much more ambitious. The treaty 
lays down a set of principles for the conduct of macroeconomic policy among 
its members:  mutual  consultations  in  the  area of  short-run  macroeconomic 
policy; the commitment to “regard exchange rate policy as a matter of common 
interest”;  and  the  possibility  of  mutual  assistance  to overcome  balance  of 
payments crises. The Monetary Committee of the European Communities dates 
back to 1958: its role was to promote the coordination of monetary policies, 
and it was formed by two representatives  from each country, one from the 
treasury, the other from the central bank. 
Behind these early steps for policy coordination in Europe lies the special 
European aversion for exchange rate fluctuations. This aversion is motivated 
by three factors. The first is rooted in Europe’s recent history. In the 1920s and 
1930s many European countries sought to defend themselves against external 
shocks  through  competitive  exchange rate  depreciations.  Many  in  Europe 
today hold those policies responsible for the disruption of international trade 
and economic activity and the ensuing collapse of European democracie~.~  The 
experience of the  1920s and  1930s is important to an understanding of the 
postwar  quest for exchange rate  stability  which  led  to the  Bretton  Woods 
system. 
Openness is the second explanation for the European distaste for exchange 
rate fluctuations. The EEC as a whole is not a particularly  open region-no 
more for example than the United States or Japan. In 1987 the share of imports 
in GDP was 12.3 percent in the EEC, 10.1 percent in the United States, and 
11.4 percent in Japan. Therefore there is no particular reason why Europeans 
should worry about the fluctuations of the ECU relative to the dollar or the 
yen-no  more at least than Americans and Japanese worry about fluctuations 
of their own currencies. But what is special in the EEC is that the region is not 
a common currency area. Individual countries have different currencies and are 
also much more open than the region as a whole. Even before the creation of 
the customs union, the share of imports in GDP was as high as 40 percent in 
Belgium and the Netherlands,  16 percent in Germany. The trade creation and 
trade diversion effects of the union rapidly raised these figures: now they are 
around 60-70  percent in the small northern countries, and 25-30  percent in 
Germany, France, Italy, and the United Kingdom. Openness however is mostly 
an intra-European  affair:  thus, to the  extent that exchange rate  fluctuations 
pose  problems for an economy,  it is the  fluctuation of  intra-EEC exchange 
rates that Europeans view as worrisome. 
The third explanation for the European  aversion to exchange rate fluctua- 
tions lies in the very institutions set up with the Treaty of Rome, and in the 
common agricultural  market  in  particular.  As  we  shall  now  explain,  the 
survival  of  the  common agricultural  market  depends upon  the stability  of 
intra-European  exchange  rates.  Consider  French  and  German  grains  for 
example: they are almost perfect substitutes. Thus, the “Law of One Price” 250  Francesco Giavazzi/Alberto Giovannini 
for cereals should hold exactly. However, input prices in  agriculture-labor 
costs in particular-do  not follow the  “Law  of One Price”:  exchange rate 
realignments could thus produce large shifts in the profitability of the farming 
sector across Europe and induce swings in agricultural trade in the region. The 
problem is aggravated by the fact that across European agricultural markets 
the “Law of One Price” rules by luw. This is so because the European Com- 
mission  regulates the cereals market by setting an EEC-wide price for each 
product.  The price  is set in ECUs and  translated in  local  currencies  at the 
ongoing exchange rate. 
Europeans,  at least since the  1960s, have agonized over the difficulty  of 
running a common market in a region that does not use a common currency. 
The rules of Bretton Woods permitted excursions of up to 3 percent between 
any two European c~rrencies.~  Such excursions were big enough to interfere 
with the functioning of the cereals market. The problem precipitated in 1969 
with the August devaluation of the French franc and the October revaluation 
of  the Deutsche mark. The response to the realignments was the temporary 
suspension of the free cereals  market. France prevented  a jump of  cereals 
prices on the home market by converting the common ECU price at an artificial 
exchange rate-one  that  did  not reflect  the  devaluation.  Germany  avoided 
being flooded with French cereals by imposing a tariff on imports and granting 
an  export  subsidy  to  its  own  farmers.  After  the  fall  of  Bretton  Woods, 
responding  to  realignments  with  the  introduction  of  tariffs  and  subsidies 
became common practice. By 1974 a German farmer exporting butter to Italy 
received a subsidy equal to 28.3 percent of the price; if the butter was shipped 
the other way, a corresponding tax was levied on the Italian exporter. 
Beyond infringing upon the basic principle on which the EEC was set up, 
the tariffs and subsidies introduced to cope with realignments have also been 
costly for the EEC budget for two reasons. The first is that it proved easier to 
remove the tariffs by letting agricultural prices rise in the devaluing country 
than to remove the subsidies by cutting prices in the revaluing country. Therefore 
the revenue from the tariffs did not match the expenditure on the subsidies. The 
persistence of export subsidies in strong-currency  countries  aggravated  Eu- 
rope’s chronic overproduction  of food. By the mid-1970s two-thirds of the 
financial resources available to the EEC were absorbed by the cost of running 
the agricultural market-leaving  very little room for action in other areas. 
Exchange rate stability then became a vital issue for the EEC, and it was thus 
natural  that the Commission  would become  a strong  supporter of  schemes 
designed to limit intra-European exchange rate fluctuations. The problem has 
not  disappeared  in  the  EMS.  The  “agri-monetary”  consequences  of  a 
realignment are an important item in the negotiations,  as documented by the 
realignment communiquks that always carefully  spell out the provisions for 
agricultural markets-the  timing of price adjustments,  etc. 
For many years, the common agricultural policy has been the only important 
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the  agricultural  market  absorbed  90 percent  of  the  total  EEC  budget;  in 
1985 the figure was still as high as 73 percent. It is unlikely that the EEC would 
still be here had it failed to keep the common agricultural market alive. Over 
the  years  the  operation  of  the  agricultural  market  has provided  the  testing 
ground  for cooperation  in  other areas.  The EEC  is  now  moving  in  new 
directions. The planned liberalization of  1992 is its first major initiative outside 
of agriculture: if successful it will reduce the importance of agriculture among 
the activities of the EEC and enhance the EEC’s role in the coordination of 
economic policies across Europe. To some extent the evolution of the EEC has 
been possible because this institution survived the difficulties of operating the 
cereals market. Exchange rate stability has thus been an important condition 
for institutional developments in Europe. 
Trying  to  understand  the  EMS without  considering  the  grounds  for the 
particular European aversion to exchange rate fluctuations would be mislead- 
ing. For the countries that belong to the EMS, leaving the system is a step that 
many  would  associate  with  the  abandonment  of  other  areas  of  European 
cooperation as well. On some crucial occasions, the link between the EMS 
and other institutions of  European cooperation has been instrumental in forcing 
policy shifts that, in turn, have made the survival of the exchange rate system 
possible. 
6.3  The EMS Is an (Imperfect) Greater Deutsche Mark Area 
Ten years of operation of the EMS provide an important case study to those 
who are interested in designing new forms of international monetary policy 
coordination. In any fixed exchange rate regime, the task of running monetary 
policy  is  not  explicitly  assigned  to  any  one  country.  Supporters of  the 
hypothesis that international monetary  policy coordination  is feasible claim 
that, in  commodity  standard  systems  like the gold standard or the  Bretton 
Woods regime, the establishment of nominal parities in terms of an external 
numeraire forces all countries to pursue the nominal  target in a symmetric 
fashion. This mechanism, it is claimed, imposes a sort of implicit coordination 
of  monetary  policies.  In  a  fiat  currency  system  like  the  EMS, systematic 
cooperation by monetary authorities could help to define common monetary 
targets to be pursued jointly by all countries. 
Are the use of an external numeraire-like  gold in the earlier fixed exchange 
rate regimes-or  the institution of consultation bodies-like  the EEC Mon- 
etary Committee and the Committee of  Central Bank Governors-effective 
enough  measures to induce international monetary policy cooperation?  The 
evidence from the EMS suggests a negative answer to that question. The EMS, 
like the gold  standard and the Bretton Woods system, is characterized by a 
“center”  country-the  Federal Republic of Germany-whose  central bank 
pursues its own monetary targets independently of the policies pursued by the 
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converged to Germany’s monetary policies, have maintained limited indepen- 
dence by  the systematic use of  capital controls and the adoption of  periodic 
exchange rate devaluations. 
The strongest evidence in support of the hypothesis that the EMS actually 
worked as some imperfect Greater Deutsche Mark Area comes from the study 
of interest rates: West German interest rates are unaffected by most intra-EMS 
shocks, like the expectations of  parity realignments,  while interest rates de- 
nominated in the other currencies suffer the full impact of intra-EMS portfolio 
disturbances.  Countries like Italy and France have sheltered their economies 
from the  wide fluctuations in interest  rates that have been  observed  in the 
(unregulated) Euromarkets  by  imposing  capital  controls.  This  situation,  as 
Giovannini (1 989) shows, is similar to that of the gold standard and the Bretton 
Woods period, when countries other than Great Britain and the United States, 
respectively, sought to defend their policies from the influence of the “center” 
country by imposing various forms of regulatory hurdles on the international 
transmission of  monetary policies.‘j 
6.4  Macroeconomic Effects: Inflation 
One of  the most dramatic changes in the economies of the EMS member 
countries since 1979 has been the decrease in the rate of  inflation. Table 6.1 
compares  inflation  rates  of  various  European  countries  at the  start of  the 
EMS with the present. The table suggests both  a significant convergence of 
European  inflation  rates  toward  the  West  German  levels,  and  a  general 
decrease of inflation, which is not  limited to the countries belonging to the 
EMS. Since we concluded in the preceding section that Germany’s monetary 
policy has been at the center of the EMS, and since West German authorities 
built a wide reputation as “inflation fighters” in the post-World  War I1 period, 
the  natural  question  raised  by  this  experience  is whether the  structure  and 
working of the EMS, and in particular  the central role played  by  the West 
Table 6.1  The European Disinflation 
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Note: GDP deflator: annual growth, percent. 
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German  monetary  authorities,  have  played  any  role  in  the  disinflation 
experience  of  countries  as different  as Denmark, France,  and Italy.  In this 
section we review  the  argument  that pegging the exchange rate can help a 
country in the disinflation effort, and we present the evidence for a number of 
EMS countries  and a country  outside  the  EMS, the  United Kingdom. The 
theoretical model points to the problem of the credibility of the exchange rate 
target  and the costs of the exchange rate union for the center country-the 
Federal Republic of Germany. In our empirical analysis we attempt to measure 
both  the  credibility  of  intra-European  exchange rate  targets  and  the  size, 
timing, and effects of shifts in the expectations after  1979. 
6.4.1  Breaking the Inflation Inertia: The Role of  Expectations 
One fundamental  feature of  the inflationary  process  in modern industrial 
economies appears to be its persistence,  a phenomenon that has been linked 
to the mechanics of wage and price setting. Firms and unions-for  a number 
of reasons that we do not need to explore here7-find  it more convenient to 
set prices and wages much less frequently than the rate of arrival of economic 
news. Therefore wages and prices are crucially affected by workers’ and firms’ 
expectations. Workers and firms are concerned, for example, to preserve the 
purchasing power of their income, and incorporate in their output prices their 
forecasts of the future evolution of the general price level. Indirectly, wage and 
price setters concerned about the evolution of the general price level need to 
forecast the stance of monetary policy. 
The special nature of wage and price setting therefore creates a problem of 
coordination between the central bank and the public. The central bank might 
want to use monetary policy to steer the economy toward a higher output path, 
but the public, anticipating  future expansionary  policies,  can sterilize them 
fully  by  incorporating  in  their  current  pricing  decisions  the  expectation  of 
future  monetary  expansion  and  higher  inflation.  This  process,  by  itself, 
generates inflation and tends to force the monetary authority to accommodate 
the  higher  rate  of  growth  of  prices,  in  order to  avoid  a  severe  recession. 
Hence in equilibrium there is higher inflation, and less output growth, than 
initially desired by both the public and the monetary authorities.  This is the 
inflationary bias of monetary policy in the presence of price and wage inertia, 
first described and analyzed by Barro and Gordon (1983). 
The coordination problem of monetary policy and sluggish prices and wages 
is also at the core of the issue of disinflation. Bringing inflation down requires 
a change in inflationary expectations on the part of price setters. How can the 
monetary authorities “convince”  price setters that an announced contraction 
will be lasting and credible? The reputation that a central bank needs to bring 
down inflation can be obtained in two ways. The first, and more painful method 
for society as a whole,  is by  showing that, even in the worst  of  a depres- 
sion, the announced monetary targets are not reneged. The initial monetary 254  Francesco Giavazzil Albert0 Giovannini 
contraction after the announcement of a disinflation plan generates a recession, 
since  it  is  imposed  in  an  economy  where  inflation  and  money  growth 
expectations are high. The slower the response of private sector expectations 
to the monetary contraction, the longer and harsher the recession, because the 
very fact that the monetary  authority sticks to the announced contractionary 
path comes to private  agents as a surprise. 
Alternatively,  the  monetary  authority  could  avoid  going  through  this 
prolonged ‘‘initiation” period by seeking a way to influence expectations with 
some institutional reform. The institutional reform of interest for us is a change 
in the  exchange rate regime. How  can the  transition from flexible to fixed 
exchange rates bring about an improvement in the output-inflation tradeoff and 
facilitate the disinflation  effort’? Under fixed exchange rates, a central bank 
tends to loosen control of the domestic supply of money, since the changes in 
international  reserves  needed  to  support the  exchange  rate  parity  produce 
changes in the domestic supply of money which,  in principle,  the monetary 
authority cannot influence. 
Now, suppose a country decides to passively peg its exchange rate to another 
country, whose monetary authority enjoys the reputation of being an inflation- 
buster. By “passive peg” we mean that the first country’s monetary authority, 
after announcing the exchange rate parity, simply accommodates the second 
country’s monetary policies,  without  any attempt to directly influence  their 
choice of targets.  What happens to the inflation  expectations of  the private 
sector?  Wage  and  price  setters  need  to  evaluate  the  credibility  of  this 
institutional  reform,  that  is  they  need  to determine  the  likelihood  that  the 
announced exchange rate targets will be pursued consistently. If, and only if, 
the exchange rate target  is a credible one, expectations  will adjust and the 
process of  disinflation  will be facilitated. 
In practice, the EMS has not completely eliminated inflation differentials. 
Countries with higher inflation rates have resorted to  periodic exchange rate 
realignments  to recover  the  losses  in competitiveness  caused  by  persisting 
inflation  differentials  and  fixed exchange rates. The disruptions  caused  by 
speculators’  expectations  of  these  exchange  rate  realignments  have  been 
limited-as  we stressed above-through  the systematic use of capital controls. 
Even when exchange rates are periodically realigned, though, pegging to a low 
inflation  country  can  improve  the  output-inflation  tradeoff.  This  happens 
because the terms-of-trade  fluctuations  that occur during the intervals when 
exchange rates are not changed provide a strong enough deterrent to central 
banks not to deviate from the center country’s monetary policies as much as 
they  would under  a pure  floating  rate regime.  With  periodic  realignments, 
however,  the  center  country’s  output-inflation  tradeoff  is affected  as  well. 
During the intervals when exchange rates are kept fixed, the center country’s 
terms of trade worsen because the partner’s inflation rate is higher than its own. 
As a consequence, the center country’s output-inflation tradeoff also worsens: 
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In  summary,  the  argument  that  pegging  to  Germany  has  helped  high- 
inflation countries in the disinflation efforts of the 1980s rests crucially on the 
assumption that exchange rate targets are more credible than monetary targets. 
In the  next section  we  try  to measure  the effects  of  the  EMS  on inflation 
expectations  and  the  short-run  output-inflation  tradeoff  among  member 
countries, and we confront the issue of the credibility of exchange-rate targets. 
6.4.2  Measuring the Shifts in Expectations 
Our discussion in the previous section suggests that one important macro- 
economic benefit of the EMS for countries other than the Federal Republic of 
Germany could have been associated with a shift in inflationary expectations 
originating from the public’s awareness that, in a fixed exchange rate regime 
like the EMS, monetary policy  is run, by  and large, by the Bundesbank.  In 
order to assess the empirical relevance of these effects, we need to measure 
the  shifts of expectations.  Consider the  dynamics  of  wages and prices.  As 
we argued above, private agents (firms and unions) set prices and wages by 
forming expectations on future macroeconomic variables, like the overall rate 
of inflation. These expectations are necessarily a function of agents’ available 
information,  reflected  in current  and  past realization  of  all relevant macro- 
economic variables. If a monetary reform like the EMS is put in place, private 
agents who believe that the reform will actually change monetary policies in 
the way described above, have to reevaluate the methods they use to extrapolate 
from past macroeconomic variables the expectations about future inflation and 
economic activity. Hence the shift in expectations,  and its effect on the in- 
flationary process,  will be reflected  in a shift of  statistical equations relating 
wages and prices to available information. In this section we study the process 
of disinflation in Denmark, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, 
Italy, and, for comparison, the United Kingdom, by comparing how the relation 
between price and wage inflation and output has shifted after the start of the 
EMS. We are concerned with both the timing of the shifts and their magnitude. 
We estimate a (quarterly) system of three equations specifying the dynamics 
of CPI inflation, wage inflation, and output growth, which we measure using 
industrial production indices. Each equation includes on the right-hand side a 
time  trend,  seasonal  dummy  variables,  four  lags  of  wage  inflation,  CPI 
inflation and industrial production growth, and dummy variables representing 
country-specific events that the model cannot explain.’  We also include four 
lags of M1 growth rates, as well as changes in the relative price of imported 
intermediate  and  final  goods.  This last  set  of  variables  is  assumed  to  be 
determined outside of the system: while innovations in wage and price inflation 
are plausibly correlated with money growth and changes in relative prices of 
intermediate and final goods, these variables are assumed to affect inflation and 
output growth only with a one-quarter lag.9 
The first question we address is whether there is evidence of a significant 
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parameter estimates was performed for each equation and each country, using 
as a cutting point the first quarter of 1979.  lo The results of the test indicate the 
presence of a structural shift only in the case of  France: in no other country 
are the shifts of wage-price dynamics after 1979 statistically significant. While 
this evidence goes against the hypothesis  that the EMS has been associated 
with a shift in expectations, the negative result is very likely to be caused by 
the low power of the parameter stability tests we employ. 
The next question  we address regards  the timing and the direction of  the 
shifts in the inflation processes.  Using parameter estimates obtained over the 
1960-79  sample, and the actual realizations of the forcing variables (money 
growth  and  relative  prices  of  intermediate  and  final  goods),  we  compute 
dynamic simulations of wage and price inflation and output growth. Table 6.2 
reports the timing and the direction of  estimated shifts in inflation and output 
dynamics obtained from the simulations. For every country we show the date 
when the simulated paths of inflation  and output growth start diverging in a 
persistent way from the actual paths, and the sign of the divergence. The words 
“higher”  and “lower”  reported in parenthesis  under each date indicate that 
the actual realizations of the variables were respectively higher and lower than 
their simulated values. 
Table 6.2 shows a number of impressive regularities. First, for all countries 
except Germany, and possibly  Denmark, actual and simulated  inflation  and 
output paths  start diverging later than the beginning  of  the  EMS. Second, 
simulations  for output  growth  tend to be  less clearcut  than  simulations  for 
inflation. And third, the directions of the divergences are opposite for Germany 
and the other countries in the table. In Germany actual inflation after 1979 is 
higher than  its  simulated  value, and  output  growth  is  lower.  The opposite 
results of Germany and the other countries  are consistent with the model of 
imported reputation.  The delayed  shifts in the output-inflation  tradeoffs  for 
most countries, which  occur well  after the  start of  the EMS, and  the very 
similar pattern followed by U.K. inflation and output, raise the question of the 
Table 6.2  The Timing and Direction of the Shift in Expectations 
Denmark  France  Germany  Ireland  Italy  United  Kingdom 
Price inflation  80:  1  83:2  19:2  82:3  8S:I  81:3 
(direction)  (lower)  (lower)  (higher)  (lower)  (lower)  (lower) 
(direction)  (lower)  (lower)  (higher)  (lower)  (lower)  (lower) 
Output growth  80:3  none  1912  none  none  none 
(direction)  (higher)  (lower) 
Wage inflation  80:2  83:2  79:2  80:2  85:l  81:l 
Note: The words “higher”  and “lower”  indicate that the actual realization of  the variables are 
respectively higher and  lower than their simulated values. The word  “more”  indicates that  no 
systematic divergence between actual and simulated values can be detected. In the case of Italy, 
the divergence between actual and simulated variables occurs close to the end of the simulation 
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nature of the shift in expectation, and of the role played by the reform of the 
exchange rate regime. 
Further evidence on the effects of the exchange rate reform on expectations is 
reported  in  figures 6.1-6.3,  which  depict the Euro-interest  rate differentials 
between three-month krone, franc, and lira deposits and deutsche mark deposits. 
Interest rate differentials contain both expectations of  exchange rates and risk 
premiums.  The presumption  is  that,  if  exchange  rate  targets  were  perfectly 
credible, both components of  the interest rate differentials would tend to zero: 
expected changes  in exchange rates  would disappear,  and  the  substitutability 
between Eurodeposits denominated in francs, marks, lire, and kroner-which  is 
presumably inversely related to risk premiums-would  increase. The figures, by 
contrast,  show that  interest rate differentials are not  stabilized after  1979. In 
particular, the years 1982 and 1983 are associated with a crisis of confidence in 
the EMS, as shown by the large increases in interest rate differentials. 
In summary, the evidence from the simulation of the output-inflation model 
suggests a delayed response in expectations,  while interest rate differentials 
indicate that expectations and risk premiums did not decrease after the start of 
the EMS. Is this evidence consistent with the theory? The failure of  interest 
rate differentials to disappear is clearly not enough to dismiss the imported 
credibility  model. Although  higher  interest rates on lira, franc, and krone 
deposits most likely indicate that private agents attached a positive probability 
3-Month Interest-Rate Differential Relative to  DM 
Year  and  Month 
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to devaluations  of  these currencies relative to the deutsche  mark, European 
countries were subject to the effects of the unprecedented  dollar appreciation 
in the early  1980s and the second oil  shock: the exchange rate mechanism 
might have limited the expected devaluations relative to a pure floating regime. 
Hence, while the forward exchange rate data seem to be inconclusive on the 
issue of  the credibility of  the exchange rate targets, there is no prima facie 
inconsistency  between the  simulation  results  and  the behavior  of  forward 
premiums. 
Finally,  we  turn  to the  analysis  of  the  magnitudes  of  the  shifts  in  the 
output-inflation tradeoffs.  Table 6.3 reports changes in inflation and cumula- 
tive output growth that have occurred in European countries since 1979, and 
compares them with simulations  of the same magnitudes  obtained  from the 
model described above. Contrast, for example, the experiences of Germany, 
Ireland, and Italy. According to our simulations, every percentage  point of 
inflation  reduction  since  1979 would  have  afforded Germany  10.7 percent 
growth: by contrast, the output growth for every point of  inflation reduction 
was only 4.10. In  the case of Ireland and Italy, our simulations predict that 
every point of inflation reduction could have afforded those countries 4.10 and 
0.67 percent growth, respectively. But in reality, real growth for every point 
of inflation reduction was higher in both cases: 6.94  percent in Ireland and 2.18 
percent in Italy. Similarly, our simulations predicted a fall in output by  1.34 
percent for every percentage point reduction of inflation in Denmark, whereas 
in  fact  output  has  increased  by  10.6 percent  for every  percentage  point 
reduction  of  inflation.  These  comparisons vividly  illustrate  the  estimated 
effects of shifts in expectations and their uneven distribution among Germany 
and the European partners. 
It  is however puzzling  that  price  and  wage expectations  seem to have 
adjusted with a lag. One possible interpretation of this puzzle is that the effects 
of  the EMS on expectations were  not  as direct  as predicted  by  the  Barro- 
Gordon (1983) model. The experience in France, Italy, and Ireland and our 
estimates of the timing of the shifts in expectations, suggest that the shifts in 
expectations  were prompted by shifts in domestic policies. 
In Italy we estimate a shift in expectations in the first quarter of  1985, in 
the  aftermath  of  a  government  decree  which  had  set  a  ceiling  on  wage 
Table 6.3  The Shift in the Output-Inflation Tradeoff 
United 
Denmark  France  Germany  Ireland  Italy  Kingdom 
End of  the simulations  84:4  85:4  86:4  88:  1  86:4  87:  1 
Predicted change in inflation  -2.57  6.78  -5.51  -8.57  -  12.87  6.63 
Cumulative change in output  19.43  5.06  13.82  39.84  18.30  12.10 
Predicted cumulative change 
in output  -3.45  26.18  58.95  59.60  8.25  9.98 
Change in inflation  -1.83  -4.86  -3.37  -9.72  -8.38  -6.23 260  Francesco Giavazzi/Alberto Giovannini 
indexation. That decree had been challenged by the unions and was eventually 
ratified by a national referendum in June 1984. 
In Ireland there was a major turnaround in economic policies in the summer 
of  1982, marked  by  an  announcement  of  tighter  guidelines  for  monetary 
policy, a decision not to devalue the central parity of the punt in the February 
and June 1982 EMS realignments, and a decision to freeze pay increases in the 
public sector. ’  ’ 
In France, the  turnaround in macroeconomic  policies occurred in March 
1983, after the expansionary experiment of the first Mitterrand government had 
produced a large current account deficit (3.5 percent of GDP) and a speculative 
attack on the franc. The government accompanied the EMS exchange realign- 
ment with a freeze in budgetary expenses, an increase in income taxes, and a 
dramatic tightening of  credit. l2 
What was the linkage between these policies and the EMS constraint? In the 
case  of  Ireland  and  France  the  linkage  is  apparent.  In  particular,  French 
authorities justified the unpopular policies as a necessary step to ensure EMS 
membership and linked the membership in the EMS to the participation in the 
EEC.13 In the case of  Italy, we were unable to find any important reference 
to  the  EMS  in  the  government  pronouncements  after  the  decree  on  wage 
indexation, but we cannot exclude the possibility that the external constraint 
might have motivated that unpopular policy. In conclusion, EMS membership 
might have helped countries other than Germany in their disinflation efforts 
only  to the  extent that  they  provided  a justification  for unpopular  policies 
vis-a-vis  the  domestic  public,  which  could  have  helped  to  strengthen  the 
credibility of  the exchange rate targets. 
6.5  The “European Alliance” 
The view of the EMS as a system designed to enhance the credibility of 
inflation-prone  countries  leaves us with  a puzzle.  What incentives does the 
Federal Republic of Germany have to belong to such a system? The imported 
credibility  model  suggests  that  the  center  country  may  be  the  loser  in  an 
agreement in which it provides the nominal anchor that helps its partners to 
disinflate. If the decision to peg to a stable currency produced an instantaneous 
adjustment of expectations,  the center country  would  be  unaffected  by  the 
decisions of  others  to  peg  to  its  currency.  But  if  learning  takes  time  and 
disinflation is a dynamic process, during the transition the terms of trade of the 
center country worsen, and so does its output-inflation tradeoff. These effects 
are obviously smaller the larger the center country is relative to its partners: 
the United States was not concerned when Grenada or Belize decided to peg 
to the dollar. But even if we consider Germany and the Netherlands a de facto 
monetary  union and we sum their economic  size, the joint GDP of  the two 
countries (one thousand billion ECUs in  1985) is still only two-thirds of  the 
joint GDP of the other members of the EMS. The EMS area also accounts for 
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The  empirical  results  described  in  section  6.4.2 seem  to  confirm  that 
Germany’s output-inflation tradeoff has worsened since the start of the EMS. 
The  evidence  would  thus  justify  the  initial  reluctance  of  the  Deutsche 
Bundesbank to join the  system. It remains  to be  explained, however,  why 
German policymakers have tried, since the late 1960s, to avoid an uncoordi- 
nated  response  of  European  countries  to the  fall  of  Bretton  Woods.  As  it 
became clear that the Bretton Woods system was approaching its final days, 
German  policymakers  became  increasingly  worried  that  other  European 
currencies might not be able to follow the appreciation of the deutsche mark 
vis-a-vis the dollar: they were preoccupied by the idea that the realignment of 
intra-European parities would disrupt the European customs union as well as 
the common  agricultural market-two  institutions that  they considered  im- 
portant to the German economy.  l4 
In this section we look for evidence of Germany’s incentives to stay in the 
EMS by analyzing the behavior of Germany’s terms of trade from the Bretton 
Woods era to the 1980s. The terms-of-trade index we use is the real effective 
exchange rate of the deutsche mark built using relative wholesale prices and 
the IMF Multilateral Exchange Rate Model (MERM) weights that are designed 
to measure a country’s competitiveness relative to its trading partners. We are 
interested in finding out whether the EMS has stabilized Germany’s terms of 
trade relative to previous periods. 
The definition of  “stability,”  however, is ambiguous. One possibility  is to 
look at the variability of unanticipated changes in the real effective exchange 
rate. This measure however eliminates most of the low-frequency components 
of  the  series.  Indeed, it could be argued  that  those  low-frequency  compo- 
nents  are  worthy  of  special  attention.  Williamson  (1983)  suggests  that 
while exchange rate volatility (measured by the standard deviation of unan- 
ticipated exchange rate changes) might have a negative impact on trade and 
welfare,  exchange rate  misulignment  (that  is  prolonged  deviations  of  the 
exchange rate from some fundamental level) is likely to bring about the largest 
costs. l5  Table 6.4 reports the  simplest  possible  measure  of  the  variability 
of  the  real  effective  exchange rate:  its  standard  deviation.  The data  are 
monthly, from 1960 to 1985. The volatility of the effective real rate increases 
dramatically after the end of Bretton Woods, but stabilizes in the EMS. The 
second  column  in  the  table  suggests  why  this  might  have  happened.  We 
construct the real effective  exchange rate of the deutsche mark vis-2-vis its 
EMS partners  and compute the correlation  between  the  index of  “global” 
competitiveness and that of Germany’s competitiveness inside the EMS. In the 
1960s and 1970s  the correlation between the two indices is very high, indicating 
that the French franc, the lira, and the other EMS currencies did not follow the 
deutsche mark-particularly  at the time of its large appreciation vis-a-vis the 
dollar after the collapse of Bretton Woods. The phenomenon reverses after 1979: 
the correlation between the global and the intra-EMS indices becomes negative, 
indicating  that  the  EMS has  limited  the  effects  of  the  fluctuations  of  the 
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Table 6.4  Federal Republic of Germany’s Terms-of-Trade 
Year: Month 
Standard Error of  Correlation between 
Real Effective Exchange Rate  Global and Intra-EEC 
(global index)  Indices of  Competitiveness 
1960:  1 -  197 1:8 
1960:  I -  1979:  1 







0.91  1 
0,620 
-0.033 
Sources:  IMF,  International  Financial  Statistics.  Real  exchange  rates  are  constructed  using 
wholesale  prices.  Effective  exchange  rate  weights  are  the  IMF-MERM  weights  for  1977, 
normalized to account for Germany’s competitiveness vis-a-vis its eight major trading partners- 
in the case of the global index-and  its four major EMS partners-in  the case of  the intra-EMS 
index. Weights are as follows. Global index: Belgium, 0.0588; France, 0.2106; Italy 0.15  I;  Japan, 
0.152; Netherlands, 0.074; Switzerland, 0.043; United Kingdom, 0.058; United States, 0.262. 
Intra-EMS index: Belgium, 0.121; France, 0.416; Italy, 0.31  I; Netherlands, 0.152. 
other EMS countries show that the phenomenon  documented in table 6.4 is 
specific to Germany. Belgium for example offers a mirror image of the German 
experience:  the  correlation  between  the  global  and  the  intra-EMS  indices 
increases after 1979. Given that Belgium is one of Germany’s major trading 
partners,  this  has  stabilized  Germany’s real  exchange rate.  The  cost  for 
Belgium has been an increase in the volatility  of  the real effective exchange 
rate. 
The evidence on Germany’s terms of trade seems to support the “European 
Alliance”  view  of  the  EMS:  the  system  has  protected  Germany  from  the 
effects of dollar fluctuations. In the early 1970s, at the time of the first dollar 
collapse,  Germany  appreciated  both  vis-a-vis  the  dollar  and  vis-a-vis  its 
European partners: the result was a large swing in the country’s terms of trade. 
After the dollar fall of  1985 the EMS currencies followed the deutsche mark 
much  closer  and  attenuated  the  impact  on Germany’s  terms  of  trade. The 
comparison between the  two periods clearly shows the extent to which  the 
EMS has stabilized Germany’s overall competitiveness. From November 1969 
to March 1973 the deutsche mark appreciated 25 percent vis-a-vis the dollar; 
this  was accompanied  by  an  18.6 percent  worsening  of  Germany’s overall 
competitiveness. During the period from January 1985 to December 1987, the 
deutsche  mark  appreciation  was  similar-27  percent-but  this  time  it  was 
accompanied by a loss of competitiveness only half as large-9  percent. 
6.6  Fiscal Implications of Monetary Convergence 
Our discussion of  the European disinflation  has so far neglected  the fiscal 
implications of monetary  convergence. The important interactions between 
inflation and the financing of budget deficits open up an additional set of issues 
concerning the economic effects of  the EMS and  the prospects of  financial 
markets  liberalization  planned  for  1992. What  has  been  the  effect  of  the 263  Can the European Monetary System be Copied Outside Europe? 
convergence  of inflation rates on the government  debt in the high-inflation 
countries? There are  two channels through  which  a disinflation  affects the 
budget. The first is direct: a monetary contraction reduces the portion of the 
budget deficit that can be financed  by  printing  money.  The second channel 
stems from the rise in real interest rates and the fall in output associated with 
the  disinflation.  When  the  gap between  the  real  rate  and  the  growth  rate 
widens,  debt  starts to  grow.  The larger  a country’s  initial  stock of  public 
debt-as  a percent of GDP-the  more serious will be the impact on the budget 
of  any increase in the real rate and of any reduction in the rate of growth. 
All these problems are particularly important in Europe because high debt 
levels and dependence on money financing were the norm in many countries 
before the start of  the EMS. Table 6.5 shows the fiscal situation of  Ireland, 
Italy, Denmark, and Belgium before the start of the EMS. We  concentrate on 
these countries, neglecting France, Germany, and the Netherlands, because the 
latter were characterized  by  neither high  debt levels  nor  significant  money 
financing-and  it  is  not  surprising  that  the  first  four  countries  eventually 
developed a fiscal problem. In  1978 none of these countries, with the possible 
exception  of  Belgium,  could  be  characterized  as  facing  a  dramatic  fiscal 
problem.  Ireland and  Italy  had  a high debt ratio and  a primary deficit  that 
exceeded the revenue from money financing, but real rates were well below 
the growth rate of income, and the ratio of debt to GDP was stable. Denmark 
had a small primary surplus and a large revenue from money financing: the sum 
of the two was more than enough to service the debt, even at high real rates. 
Belgium is the only country where debt was growing. 
To analyze the effects of inflation convergence on debt and deficits, we need 
to  isolate the components of  government deficits and of debt dynamics. We 
study the government budget constraint: 
Table 6.5  Fiscal Conditions at the Start of the EMS (as percent of  1978 GDP) 
Money Financing 
Debt Level  Money Financing  Plus Primary Surplus  r  (r - n) 
Belgium  0.65  0.0 
Italy  0.51  2.2 
Ireland  0.82  1.8 
Denmark  0.18  3.4 
-  2.0 
-  3.5 
-2.2  - 
f5.2 
- 
3.0  0.0 
0.6  -7.8 
2.4  -5.1 
5.5  4.0 
Note: Debt level is the stock of  public debt on the market, that is, total debt net of debt held by 
the  central  bank.  Money  financing  corresponds  to  the  public  sector borrowing  requirement 
financed by  the central bank.  Primary surplus is the budget deficit net of  interest. The ex post 
short-term real rate of  interest is r, and n is the growth rate of  GDP at constant prices. 
Sources: The fiscal variables for Ireland and Italy are from the local central bank Bulletins. For 
Belgium and Denmark. debt levels are from Chouraqui et al. (1986); money financing and the debt 
held by the central bank are computed from line 12a of International Finuncial Statistics. Interest 
rates and growth rates for all countries are from Europeun Economy. 264  Francesco Giavazzi/Alberto Giovannini 
The increase in the stock of government debt, B,  equals the capitalized value 
of  last  period’s  debt,  less the  increase  in  credit to the  government  by  the 
central bank (C, - C,  ~  I ),  plus the noninterest (or primary) budget deficit. 
B,  and C, denote stocks of credit at the end of  period t, and  i, is the interest 
rate on government  borrowing  from the  end of  period  t - 1  to the end  of 
period t. Dividing both sides of the equation by nominal income at time t, Y,, 
and applying the usual approximations,  we obtain: 
where  lowercase  letters  denote  the  corresponding  variables  in  uppercase 
letters expressed  as percent  of  GNP.  Equation  (2) says that  the increase in 
government debt is higher, the higher the real interest burden on the existing 
stock  of  debt-measured  by  the  real  interest  rate  in  excess  of  the  rate  of 
growth of the economy-and  the higher the primary deficit. An  alternative 
means  of  financing  deficits  is  represented  by  the  last  two  terms  on  the 
right-hand side of equation  (2):  the increase of credit to the government by 
the  central  bank  (in  percent  of  GNP), seigniorage,  and  the  inflation  tax. 
Seigniorage  is  represented  by  (c, - c, - I) and  n, - [c,  -  that  is,  the 
noninflationary growth of the total stock of credit from the central bank. The 
inflation tax (in percent of GNP) is r,c,  ~ 
In the steady state, barring nonneutralities of the tax system, the only fiscal 
consequence of a slowdown in the rate of inflation is the change in seigniorage 
revenue and in the inflation tax. If the economy is along the efficient portion 
of the revenue curve, both seigniorage and the inflation tax fall. Thus a country 
that prior to the disinflation relied on seigniorage and on the inflation tax as 
sources of  revenue  must  sooner  or later correct  its  primary  deficit.  If  the 
country could simply jump from the high- to the low-inflation steady state and 
the fiscal correction occurred simultaneously with the jump in inflation, the 
debt level would be unaffected by the change in monetary regime. But if the 
country postpones the fiscal correction, debt grows: the longer the postpone- 
ment, the larger becomes the change in the primary deficit required to stabilize 
the debt because in the meantime the stock of the debt has grown. 
The response of European fiscal authorities to the revenue loss induced by 
the disinflation was uneven. Denmark and Ireland swiftly turned the primary 
deficit into a large surplus; Italy waited. Thus arises the question of what is the 
cost of waiting. How quickly does the required change in the primary deficit 
grow  if  you  delay  the  fiscal  correction?  Figure  6.4 helps  to  answer  this 
question. On the vertical and on the horizontal axis we have, respectively, the 
primary  deficit  and  the  debt  level.  The two  downward  sloping  schedules 
describe steady states in which the ratio of public debt to GDP is constant. 
They are drawn for two different levels of (IT  + n)c,  the steady-state revenue 
from money  financing in equation  (2).  Money financing is higher along the 265  Can the European Monetary System be Copied Outside Europe? 
Slope =  -(r-n) 
Fig. 6.4  The effects of  delaying fiscal adjustment 
upper schedule than it is along the lower one. The slope of the two schedules 
is  -(I -  n):  if the interest rate is above the growth rate of income a higher 
debt level requires a smaller primary deficit. As (r -  n)  becomes smaller, the 
schedules  flatten  out  since  the  cost  of  sustaining  higher  debt  levels  also 
becomes smaller. 
Consider now a country starting off from a point such as A, and assume that 
inflation jumps to zero, so that it loses all the revenue from the inflation tax. 
If  the  fiscal authorities correct the budget immediately,  the country  simply 
moves from A to B at an unchanged stock of debt. But if the fiscal correction 
is delayed, the economy starts drifting fromA toward a point such as A'.  How 
fast  does  the  required  fiscal  correction  grow? The difference  between  the 
budget correction required in A and in A' is (r - a)  times the increase in the 
stock of  debt: that is, the required fiscal correction grows at (r -  n). 
Suppose a country starts off with a 75 percent ratio of public debt to GDP 
and  a primary  deficit equal to 2  percent  of  GDP. Assume  that  prior to the 
disinflation,  money  financing  brought  into  the  coffers  of  the  treasury  3.5 266  Francesco Giavazzi/Alberto Giovannini 
percent of  GDP each  year,  and that  (r - n) is equal to  0.02. If  the fiscal 
correction is done immediately, it must fully offset the loss in money financing: 
if  this falls to zero, the primary deficit must move from a 2 percent deficit to 
a surplus of  1.5  percent.  l6 If the fiscal correction does not take place, ten years 
later the debt level will have grown from 50 to 90 percent of GDP, but the fiscal 
correction required to stabilize it will have grown only from 1.5 to 1.8 percent 
of GDP. 
This  simple example  suggests that,  if  policymakers’  public  support  is 
negatively affected by a fiscal contraction, there is a strong incentive to wait. 
A delay in fiscal adjustmcnt increases the chances of reelection of  the current 
government. Come tomorrow, the fiscal contraction-and  the accompanying 
loss of consensus-will  be only slightly higher. Waiting can be very attractive. 
The output response to the monetary contraction  and to the turnaround in 
fiscal  policy  has further effects  on the dynamics of  the  stabilization.  As 
discussed  in section 6.3, the decision  to peg  to a stable currency  does not 
produce an instantaneous shift in expectations: thus, the impact effect of  the 
central bank’s decision to embark on a new monetary path, consistent with the 
peg, is an increase in real interest rates. The rise in interest rates will depress 
output,  so  that  during  the  transition  (r -  n) will  be  higher:  this  is  the 
secondary burden of the disinflation. In addition, lower output will reduce tax 
revenues and add a cyclical component to the primary deficit. If, on top of this, 
the primary deficit is abruptly cut, it is unclear whether the simple jump from 
A to B  described in figure 6.4 is at all possible. 
In Table 6.6 we show the results of  simple simulations designed to capture 
the dynamics of debt in the presence of  a response to the monetary contraction 
by output, real rates, and the budget. Rows 1, 2, and 3 illustrate the example 
discussed above. Rows 2 and 3 correspond, respectively, to the instantaneous 
Table 6.6  Disinflation, Debt, and the Budget 
Simulation 
Monetary  Budget Surplus Required 
Debt  Financing  for Debt Stabilization 
I.  Initial conditions  0.75  0.035 
2. Instantaneous fiscal correction  0.75  0.0 
4. Fiscal correction after  10 years with 
5. Fiscal correction after  10 years with 
3. Fiscal correction after  10 years  0.91  0.0 
(r - n)  effect  I .07  0.0 
(r -  n)  and cyclical effects  I .20  0.0 





Note: In all simulations the steady-state value of (r - n)  is 0.02. In cases 2 and 3 the stabilization 
has no effect on real variables. In case 4 output falls and real rates nse during the disinflation, but 
there are no cyclical effects on the budget. The path of (r  ~  n)  is: year 1: 0.07; year 2: 0.07; year 
3: 0.05; year 4: 0.04; year 5:  0.03; and year 6:  0.02. In case 5 (I - n)  rises and the recession 
raises the budget deficit. The paths of  (r - n)  and of the cyclical component of  the budget are 
(r - n. cycl.): year 1: 0.07.0.035; year 2: 0.07, 0.035; year 3: 0.05, 0.020; ycar4: 0.04, 0.010; 
year 5: 0.03, 0.005; year 6: 0.02, 0.0. 267  Can the European Monetary System be  Copied Outside Europe? 
fiscal correction and to the case when the correction comes ten years later. The 
simulation reported in row 4 allows for a temporary increase in (r -  n),  which 
jumps from 2 to 3 percent at the outset of the disinflation and then gradually 
falls back to 2 percent. l7 The fiscal correction occurs, as in case shown in row 
3 after ten years.  Row 5 extends the example by including the effect of the 
recession on the budget. The recession is assumed to worsen the budget by an 
amount equal to 3.5 percent of  GDP in the first year, which gradually returns 
to zero in six years. 
The results of  these  simulations suggest  that  the effects of  the monetary 
convergence on the government debt of some EMS members has been sizable 
and could make the fiscal situation of countries like Italy and Ireland more and 
more difficult to manage. Such convergence is however necessary to achieve 
a sustainable elimination of inflation rate differentials. 
6.7  Concluding Remarks 
In this paper we have reviewed  the experience of the EMS to identify the 
lessons that this experiment in monetary coordination could provide to those 
who are considering  a reform of the international monetary system. 
Clearly, an institution like the EMS would not work outside of Europe, for 
a number of  reasons. First, the incentives that countries have to belong to the 
EMS-the  high degree of integration of European economies, and the more 
comprehensive design of institutional integration, of which the EMS is just an 
element and which lends credibility to the EMS exchange rate targets-are  not 
present, say, among the United States, Europe, and Japan. Second,  the operation 
of monetary policies has not been linked to the exchange rate constraint by all 
countries: the Federal Republic of Germany appears to have pursued its own 
monetary targets without attempting to accommodate international influences, 
while the other countries have either followed Germany’s policies, or changed 
exchange rates, or imposed capital controls. The striking similarity between 
the EMS and previous experiences of  fixed exchange rates suggests that the 
institution of fixed rates cannot, per se, induce international monetary policy 
cooperation. Finally,  the differences in the use  of  the  inflation  tax  among 
European countries and the divergent behavior of  government debt after 1979 
indicate that the pursuit of  monetary convergence among countries with dif- 
ferent fiscal structures might entail substantial fiscal reforms. 
Notes 
I. An important exception is the United Kingdom which remained outside the EMS. 
2.  Ideally  this  question should  be  answered  by  integrating the  analysis of  the 
informational benefits of a common currency (or fixed exchange rates) with the analysis 
of the macroeconomic effects of alternative exchange rate regimes. Unfortunately, the 268  Francesco GiavazzilALberto Giovannini 
current models of money  are still  ill-suited for  such an ambitious task.  Hence  we 
concentrate here on the macroeconomic aspects. 
3. The memory of these events is kept alive by the Nurske’s illuminating account of 
the effects of the exchange rate policies of the  1920s. See Nurske (1944). 
4. The rules set 1 percent margins around the dollar parity of each currency, thus in 
principle  permitting  bilateral  excursions  of  up  to  4  percent.  European  countries 
however had  agreed to  maintain  their  dollar  parities  within  smaller margins:  0.75 
percent. 
5. See Giovannini (1989) for a historical comparison of the gold standard, Bretton 
Woods, and  the EMS, a formal  statement of  the  “asymmetry”  hypothesis,  and  an 
analysis of the empirical evidence. 
6. In the form of changes in regulations affecting the gold market and of controls on 
international capital flows. 
7. See, for example, Blanchard (1988) and Rotemberg (1988) for excellent surveys. 
8. The dummies are the following: for all countries, from 1971:3 to the end of the 
sample, fall of the fixed rates regime; for Italy, 69:2-70:  1 Aurumno Caldo, 73:3-74:  1 
price freeze; for France, 63:4-64:4,  69:l-70:4,  74:  1  -74:4,  77:l-77:4,  82:3-83:4 
wage  and  price  controls;  68:2-68:3  “May  1968;”  for the  United  Kingdom,  67:4 
sterling devaluation,  73:4-74:4  wage controls. 
9. The estimates are obtained assuming that superneutrality holds, that is, the sum 
of the coefficients of  nominal variables is equal to 1 in the equations explaining wage 
and  price  inflation,  and  is  zero  in  the  equation  explaining  output  growth.  These 
constraints were not rejected in the largest majority of cases. 
10. In  Giavazzi and Giovannini (1989) we report a more detailed analysis of the 
model and all the statistical results. Detailed statistics for Ireland, which do not appear 
there, are available from us on request. 
1  1. Dornbusch (1988). 
12. Sachs and Wyplosz (1986). 
13. Sachs and Wyplosz (1  986). 
14. For an account of the German position in those years see Emminger (1977) and 
Kloten (1978). 
15. Recent  research  by  Krugman  and  Baldwin  (1987),  Baldwin  and  Krugman 
(1986).  Dixit (1987), and especially  Krugman  (1988) provides  the  first attempt at 
formalizing the linkage between the uncertainty and slow mean-reversion in exchange 
rate movements and the speed of  adjustment of intersectoral factor movements and 
investment. 
16. In reality, even if  inflation falls to zero, not all money financing will be lost. At 
-r =  0 money financing is equal to nc. 
17. The precise figures are shown at the bottom of table 6.6. 
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Comment  Richard C. Marston 
This paper is the latest of several influential studies of the European Monetary 
System by Giavazzi and Giovannini. It addresses two questions:  Why does 
Europe have a stronger aversion to exchange rate fluctuations than elsewhere, 
and what incentives are there for countries to participate in the system? Let me 
begin with the latter question. 
Giavazzi and Giovannini analyze the potential  role of  the EMS in estab- 
lishing credible anti-inflation policies in countries like France or Italy. Drawing 
on earlier work by Barro and Gordon (1983), they argue that such countries 
have found it difficult to establish credible anti-inflation policies because there 
are incentives for a central bank to depart from such policies once the private 
sector has come to believe in them. Throughout the past few decades, however, 
the Bundesbank has established a sound reputation for inflation fighting. The 
EMS offers countries like France an opportunity to gain credibility for their 
inflation policies by tying their monetary policy to that of  the Bundesbank. 
Richard C. Marston is James R. F. Guy Professor of Finance and Economics at the Wharton 
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This motivation for the EMS is certainly important, but as the authors point 
out, doubts about the credibility of the exchange rate pegs may undermine the 
credibility of the inflation policy. Since the EMS was founded in 1979, in fact, 
there have been eleven realignments of  parity values. France and Italy alone 
have realigned  on five occasions  each. During  many  of  those realignment 
periods, forward exchange premiums for the franc and lira have soared, thus 
showing how little credibility the existing pegs enjoyed. But despite so many 
realignments, it may still be the case that the EMS imparted an anti-inflationary 
bias to each country’s monetary policy, lowering inflation below what it might 
have been without the EMS. 
Giavazzi and Giovannini decide to investigate this issue empirically, and so 
they  provide  several  different  types  of  evidence  concerning  changes  in 
inflation. The first is in their table 6.1 where they show a sharp reduction in 
inflation rates  for the EMS countries in  1987 compared with  1978.  I  made 
similar calculations for the United States and Japan. These are shown in table 
C6.1. Japan’s experience is remarkably similar to that of the Netherlands, and 
the U.S. experience  is similar to that of Belgium, the  Federal Republic of 
Germany, and Denmark. So there may be worldwide factors rather than just 
EMS-wide factors at work in lowering inflation. 
The authors also set out to estimate nonstructural equations for inflation to 
determine  whether  there  was  a  shift  in  behavior  after  1979. Their results 
indicate that only France experienced a structural shift that was statistically 
significant, and that shift occurred not in 1979 but in 1983 when the Mitterrand 
government  changed  its  policies.  They  point  out  that  the  test  has  low 
explanatory power, so they also conduct postsample simulations to see whether 
their equations estimated for the pre-EMS period track the EMS period itself. 
Their table 6.2 is quite interesting in that it shows a symmetrical pattern  of 
inflation effects. Germany experienced a higher inflation than predicted,  and 
the other countries (including a floating country, the United Kingdom), a lower 
inflation rate than predicted. This evidence suggests that the Bundesbank has 
perhaps compromised its inflation policy in trying to maintain fixed rates with 
the EMS. However, there is no evidence that the shifts in the equations are 
statistically  significant.  Second,  there  is  no  comparison  with  non-EMS 
countries  (except  the  United  Kingdom)  to  see  whether  this  shift  is just 
Table C6.1  Disinflation Outside of the EMS 
1978  1987 
United States  7.4  3.0 
Japan  4.8  -  0.3 
Source: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics 
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coincident with the EMS rather than being caused by it. As the authors would 
be the  first to admit, it  is not  enough  to compare pre-EMS  and  post-EMS 
periods and attribute all economic changes in Europe to the EMS. 
I would  like to expand on this  point by citing recent studies by  Ungerer 
et al. (1986) and Collins (1988). Ungerer et al. estimated equations explaining 
inflation rates in EMS and non-EMS countries by inverting money demand 
functions. That study concluded that there was a structural shift in the inflation 
equations  for  Europe  in  the  period  after  the  EMS  was  founded.  Collins 
reestimated the equations  and tested  for both  an EMS effect  and a general 
post-1979 effect common to all countries in the sample. She showed that the 
only significant effect was due to a post-1979  shift variable common to all 
countries, EMS and non-EMS alike. Her paper again emphasizes the danger 
in attributing lower inflation  in the EMS to the EMS when  lower inflation 
characterizes countries outside the EMS as well. 
There is a third issue that should be raised regarding the inflation equations 
estimated by Giavazzi and Giovannini. The tests for structural shifts in these 
equations are based on simulations using the actual values of money growth 
experienced over the period. But in the Barro-Gordon (1983) model, it is the 
entire  equilibrium  between  the  government  and  the  private  sector  that  is 
affected by the credibility of the inflation policy. If the government were able 
to precommit to a different inflation policy, we might find structural changes 
in  the money  growth  process itself.  The rate of  growth  would presumably 
shift, but so also might any feedback mechanism that determines the response 
of  the money  supply to other variables.  This possibility  may  be  worth  ex- 
ploring. 
Giavazzi  and  Giovannini also  ask  whether  there  are  any  costs to  an 
anti-inflation policy in Europe. The authors provide an interesting analysis of 
the  effects  of  lower inflation  on fiscal  revenues,  calculating  the  potential 
revenue loss due to the removal of the inflation tax from money balances. The 
authors, however, do not ask whether it is possible to expand the tax base (i.e., 
reserve money) by raising reserve requirements. I assume that they dismissed 
this  policy  action because  of  its distortionary  effects on the banking sector 
(encouraging as it would the growth of near-money substitutes free of the tax). 
They do ask how costly it would be for a country to postpone fiscal adjustment 
after lowering inflation, and they  reach the surprising conclusion that post- 
ponement for as long as ten years would raise the required tax burden only 
marginally. 
The authors discuss at length why Europeans place so much emphasis on 
exchange rate stability. The dependence of EMS countries on trade with one 
another is an important part of the story. In the case of France, for example, 
over 40 percent of French trade is with other EMS countries. Fixed rates within 
the EMS help to stabilize the relative prices of goods originating in other EMS 
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Trade patterns, however,  are only one part of  the  story. It’s equally  im- 
portant  to  know  the  predominant  source  of  the  economic  disturbances 
affecting  a  country.  Contrast  the  French  trade  pattern  with  the  pattern  of 
Canada where over 80 percent  of Canadian trade is with the United States. 
Canada thus is more than twice as dependent on trade with its closest trading 
partner as is France with  all of  its EMS trading  partners.  Yet  Canada  has 
allowed its exchange rate vis-2-vis the U.S. dollar to vary quite substantially 
over time.  The reason  may  be  that  Canada  wants  to insulate  itself  from 
disturbances  originating in its main trading partner.  In the case of the EMS, 
it’s  natural  to  ask  why  there  isn’t  a  similar concern  about  disturbances 
originating in one or more EMS countries  affecting the rest of the EMS. 
One of the main motivations for setting up the EMS in 1979 was to create 
a “zone of monetary stability”  in Europe, shielding European countries from 
outside, not inside, disturbances. Many in Europe believed at the time that the 
main  source  of  disturbances  was  the  United  States  economy  and  dollar 
financial markets. (Marston 1985 analyzes the effects of such disturbances on 
EMS countries.) Experience with a widely fluctuating dollar in the 1980s could 
only have reinforced this belief. So it’s not just the trade pattern itself, but the 
desire to insulate Europe from disturbances originating from the outside, which 
motivates the system. 
But a system well-suited for the  1970s and 1980s may be less desirable in 
later years if the source of disturbances  shifts.  If disturbances originating in 
Europe assume increased importance (or if disturbances involving the dollar 
diminish  in importance), the EMS may  not seem so desirable, since fixing 
bilateral  rates inhibits  adjustment  to European disturbances.  In  the  United 
States or most other national economies, adjustment to disturbances between 
regions within the country can occur because there is sufficient internal factor 
mobility. A decline in demand for products from the rust-belt of the United 
States, for example, induces movement of labor to the sun-belt. Labor mobility 
in Europe, except among unskilled guest workers, is much less evident than 
in the United States. Even the coming of 1992 will not necessarily make French 
workers want to move to Frankfurt or British workers to Marseilles. 
Perhaps this means that Europe needs to maintain some flexibility in its fixed 
exchange rate  system  to facilitate  required  changes in  real  exchange  rates 
between European currencies. If this is true, then the movement to a common 
central bank may need to be reconsidered. A common central bank would solve 
the  problem  of  credibility  for  an  anti-inflation  policy,  since  there  would 
presumably  be no way for individual  governments to depart from the EMS 
norm. But the loss of the option to change parities may be undesirable in a 
Europe without other means of  internal adjustment. 
There are other issues raised by this paper which I have not had a chance 
to address. As in the case of their previous papers on the EMS, Giavazzi and 
Giovannini have provided numerous insights about how the EMS works and 
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Comment  Wolfgang Rieke 
Giavazzi and Giovannini start with the question:  “Why did Europeans set up 
the EMS?” (see sec. 6.2) We know the answers. President Giscard d’Estaing 
and Chancellor Schmidt felt strongly that Europe should be able to speak with 
a stronger voice and have an effective answer to the policy of benign neglect 
of the dollar pursued by the United States at the time. This argument may have 
weighed more heavily  with Schmidt than with Giscard, given the persistent 
strength of the deutsche mark, but it met with the French desire for progress 
on the monetary integration front in Europe, a desire which had been frustrated 
earlier in the 1970s (Werner Plan). Both Giscard and Schmidt agreed that the 
European Economic Community was  in  dire need  of  a new initiative,  and 
monetary integration appeared to offer the opportunity for it. They adhered to 
the  fixed  but  adjustable  rate  philosophy  which the  Committee of  Twenty 
(G-20) had agreed should be the basis of any reformed world monetary system 
when the committee wound up its work in 1974. Both Giscard and Schmidt 
were finance ministers of their countries at the time and as such involved in 
the reform exercise. 
The economic arguments listed by the authors in their paper are well taken, 
historically  and otherwise. The greater openness argument  probably  should 
come first, together with the fact that a large share of cross-border trade of all 
European countries is with each other, and it is in large part trade in goods and 
services with a high added value that is sensitive to exchange rate fluctuations. 
The producers of such tradable goods and services can be severely affected by 
exchange rate fluctuations, and they will not always be able to hedge these risks 
at reasonable costs. In their relations with third countries, trade in commodities 
weighs  more heavily.  As is well known, commodities are affected by  price 
fluctuations  of  considerable magnitude that  are  largely  unrelated  to  cost 
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factors. Exchange rate variations are thus only one component of uncertainty 
with which trade in commodities has to cope. 
The proponents of the EMS were confident that exchange rates could in fact 
be  stabilized  between  countries  that  shared  important objectives  and  were 
willing to pursue appropriate policies. Exchange rate stabilization vis-a-vis the 
most important international currency, the dollar, looked far less feasible. On 
the  U.S.  side, such  attempts  would  indeed  have  been  in  conflict  with  the 
monetarist doctrine adopted by the Reagan administration. But even assuming 
that  the  United  States, Japan, and Europe  shared important  objectives  and 
pursued  the appropriate policies,  the huge potential for international capital 
flows  would  have  made  stabilization  of  dollar  rates  vis-a-vis  major  other 
currencies in the international money game difficult or impossible. 
As noted  by  the authors the  EEC’s agricultural policy  was  an important 
factor in the actual operation of the EMS. For a time the EMS functioned on 
the hypothesis that decisions on exchange rates should not be affected by their 
possible implications for agricultural policy if they were considered necessary 
for macroeconomic reasons by  all partners in the EMS. After all, agriculture 
accounts only  for  a small  share of  GNP.  But  this  proved  an  illusion.  The 
insistence on exchange rate fixity in the EMS today is in no small measure due 
to this factor. 
In recent years, the credibility aspect has gained in importance insofar as the 
commitment to a fixed exchange rate (vis-%-,is the deutsche mark) has become 
a basic element of the anti-inflation policy of EMS countries. (The same is true 
of certain non-EMS participants, e.g., Austria, but also the United Kingdom, 
a participant in the EMS, but not in the ERM.) France feels strongly that resort 
to exchange rate adjustment to correct trade and payments imbalances would 
call into question the government’s determination to deal effectively with the 
domestic causes of inflation and external competitiveness. As far as the current 
situation is concerned, it is also felt that a realignment could not be justified 
with  reference  to  price  and  cost  differentials  which  had  been  the  agreed 
criterion for earlier exchange rate realignments.  An urgent need is constantly 
seen for faster German economic growth to deal with intra-EMS imbalances. 
The  recent  acceleration  of  economic  growth  in  the  Federal  Republic  of 
Germany is thus most welcome, though it appears to owe as much to stronger 
demand  growth  outside  Germany  (and  could  well  result  in  even  larger 
payments imbalances) as to stronger domestic demand growth. 
These considerations give rise to questions as to how the EMS is functioning 
and how it should function in the view of some of its partners. Giavazzi and 
Giovannini  speak  of  the  EMS as “an  (imperfect)  Greater  Deutsche  Mark 
Area.” On the one hand, it is generally recognized that the key currency role 
of the deutsche mark and the monetary policy of the Bundesbank have provided 
the EMS with a reliable anchor of stability. The tricky n - 1 problem has thus 
been solved. But on the other hand, the German policy mix is said to impose 
a deflationary bias on the system. The argument appears to be contradictory. 
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deutsche mark appears to be acceptable to the extent that it is necessary for the 
achievement of price stability within the whole EMS, allowing-at  least for 
a time-other  partners to rely on Germany to produce a “stability  surplus” 
for export to them  rather than rely on their own homemade  stability.  It  is 
unacceptable to the extent that it impedes faster growth and external adjust- 
ment within the EEC and in relation to third countries. 
The critics appear to be more confident than are the German authorities of 
Germany’s ability to generate domestic demand growth that would be strong 
enough to reduce the current surplus without also giving free reign to stronger 
inflationary pressures.  (I believe the same point is made by Paul Krugman in 
ch. 4 of this volume.) They also seem to be confident that Germany’s partners 
could bring about the expenditure shifts needed to accommodate the external 
adjustment without adverse inflationary consequences,  thus enabling them to 
rely more on homemade price stability. To the extent that exchange rates had 
already moved out of line, these countries would in fact have to be prepared 
to push their inflation rate below the German rate for awhile if exchange rate 
adjustment is to be avoided. One may well have doubts whether this is likely 
to occur. 
The “Greater  Deutsche Mark Area” argument does point to an asymmetry 
of rights and obligations.  It is true that the Bundesbank enjoys full indepen- 
dence in its special area of responsibility  and competence  within Germany, 
partly for historical reasons. It also enjoys relative policy autonomy within the 
EMS, based on its economic weight and the accepted (rather than imposed) key 
currency role of the deutsche mark in that system. German interest rates are 
less affected than those of other countries by intra-EMS shocks. The monetary 
aggregates are relatively unaffected by intervention that is undertaken within 
the margins, the technique preferred by our partners in recent years. But this 
ignores  that  current  account  surpluses  and  capital  inflows  will  affect  the 
aggregates directly, forcing the Bundesbank to satisfy the additional liquidity 
needs of the banking system generated thereby.  It can, of course, try to undo 
these effects by action on its interest rates, but this will take time to have its 
impact on the aggregates. And such action may well attract additional capital 
inflows and add to the surplus on current account, if the exchange rate is left 
unchanged. 
The argument also ignores that the Bundesbank is exposed to outside shocks 
and that the deutsche mark is more exposed to currency competition are other 
currencies, given its preferred status as an international currency. This reduces 
its policy autonomy, sometimes in ways that are felt to cause difficulties within 
the EMS, though at times it will ease such difficulties and help maintain cohesion 
of exchange rates in the system. The bottom line is that the Bundesbank’s policy 
autonomy is substantially circumscribed in today’s integrated world economy 
and financial market environment. 
If policy autonomy of the Bundesbank is not complete to begin with, why 
not share it more evenly with other partners so that common objectives can be 
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at present. Would common decision-making carry the same credibility‘? Given 
the still existing differences on major objectives, on available policy trade-offs 
and  on  instrument  effectiveness,  there  seem  to  be  reasons  for  caution.  In 
Germany, common decision-making would cause considerable unease at this 
stage. It will only be overcome once the principle is firmly laid down that 
monetary stability is the sole or prime objective and responsibility of monetary 
policy, and that the central bank should enjoy a high degree of independence 
from the political authorities. At present, reference to the strong position of the 
Federal Republic of Germany and of the Bundesbank helps to calm domestic 
concerns that the EMS may be used as an instrument to undermine the stability 
of  the deutsche mark. 
The discussion about the inflatiodgrowth trade-off leads the authors to ask: 
“What incentives does the Federal Republic of Germany have to belong to 
such a system?” My own inclination has been to look at this question in terms 
of costs and benefits. If Germany’s closest trading partners (who are also its 
partners in a common effort that extends beyond the monetary and economic 
area) make greater efforts to achieve overall economic balance and monetary 
stability, it will be to Germany’s benefit as well. What are these benefits? They 
are partly based on the belief that price stability will help to achieve sustained 
economic growth. Resource allocation will be positively affected if economic 
agents  see  less  reason  to  allow  for (uncertain)  inflation  in  their  decision- 
making.  This view is supported  by the observation that countries with high 
inflation do not generally have higher growth and less unemployment, though 
the causalities may be difficult to establish. Also, less homemade inflation in 
Germany’s partner countries will reduce the potential  for imported inflation 
and should reduce the need for exchange rate adjustment in its turn. (As argued 
earlier, exchange rate adjustment confronts the authorities with problems, e.g., 
in the area of  agriculture.) 
The reality is, of course, that some partners have relied on an overvalued 
currency  to achieve greater price  stability at home  for longer than  may  be 
desirable on both  sides. Germany  can be  expected  to  produce  a  “stability 
surplus”  for export to others only so long as monetary  stability in Germany 
itself is not put at risk. And there is a constant danger that the growing external 
imbalances  which  go with  the  efforts to  avoid  inflation  differentials  from 
growing will themselves become a source of tension. 
The desire to protect German industry from the volatility of the dollar was 
a factor in setting up the EMS. Indeed, during the 1980s a major part of total 
German  foreign  trade  was  protected  from  the  effects  of  massive  dollar 
misalignment,  though this  did not eliminate all the negative effects, as the 
reaction of the economy to the subsequent dollar correction demonstrated. But 
if, as  is  presently  the  case,  the  exchange  rate  is  virtually  excluded  as an 
adjustment instrument,  and partner countries at the  same time fail to apply 
effective domestic policies to deal with  the  causes of growing internal and 
external imbalances, then the price paid by the surplus country may become 
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To  conclude, I  agree with the authors that the EMS could not simply be 
copied at the global level for the very reasons cited by them. But this is not 
a final verdict against a future system based on world-scale fixed but adjustable 
rates, even though  today  and for the foreseeable  future this kind of system 
seems unrealistic. Other options seem unattractive enough on various grounds 
to suggest that the fixed rate option cannot be discarded once and for all. This Page Intentionally Left Blank